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INTRODUCTION 
Commentators describe the institution of the American jury as both 
a blessing and a curse.  On the positive side, scholars hail the jury as a 
stalwart protector of defendants from an overly oppressive government.1  
Judges praise juries for providing an additional measure of perceived 
fairness and credibility to the United States legal system.2  The presence 
of a jury tends to encourage simplification of complex issues.3  Further, 
service on a jury provides a practical education in civics to the American 
public.4  These praises, however, are sung more loudly in some corners 
of the legal world than in others.  For example, many practitioners in 
 
*Amy Tindell attended Dartmouth College with a major in Cognitive Science and continued 
her education at the University of Michigan to complete a Ph.D. in Biopsychology.  Amy 
graduated from Boston College Law School in May 2008 and now practices intellectual 
property law at Bromberg & Sunstein LLP in Boston. 
1. Davin M. Stockwell, Comment, A Jury of One’s (Technically Competent) Peers?, 21 
WHITTIER L. REV. 645, 662–63 (2000).  
2. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Ariz., 738 F.2d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1984); see also 
Stockwell, supra note 1. 
3. Deborah M. Altman, Comment, Defining the Role of the Jury in Patent Litigation:  
The Court Takes Inventory, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 699, 707 (1997).  
4. See generally D. GRAHAM BURNETT, A TRIAL BY JURY (2001). 
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patent law view jury fact-finding in their cases as a curse.  At best, 
patent litigators may perceive juries as simply unequipped to 
understand complex technical, scientific, and legal standards involved in 
patent cases.5  Tangential issues are thus viewed as more likely to sway a 
patent jury that does not understand more challenging issues central to 
a case.6  At worst, patent juries are thought to be just plain biased in 
favor of patentees who have the benefit of approval from the experts at 
the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).7   
In accordance with these critiques of juries in patent trials, the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) has narrowed the 
role of the jury in patent trials.8  Moreover, the Supreme Court has for 
the most part affirmed these Federal Circuit’s decisions.9  The reasoning 
of these opinions that limit the jury’s role in patent litigation stands in a 
shadow cast by the Seventh Amendment’s codification of the right to a 
jury trial in certain civil trials.10  The combination of developing patent 
law and varying interpretations of how to apply the Seventh 
Amendment to patent cases has created the current inconsistent 
approach to the division of labor between judges and juries in patent 
litigation.   
Despite limits placed on jury decision-making in patent cases and 
practitioner complaints about jury outcomes, the number of patent cases 
involving juries is increasing.11  Statistical analyses of recent patent cases 
confirm that whether a judge or jury serves as the fact-finder has a 
significant impact on outcomes12 even though neither fact-finder 
traditionally has technical or scientific training.13  The Federal Circuit’s 
juggling of factual matters, legal matters, precedent, and the Seventh 
Amendment in patent cases demonstrates that perhaps the round peg of 
patent law does not fit into the proverbial rectangular jury box.   
In an attempt to fit these incongruous pieces together, this paper will 
 
5. Gregory D. Leibold, Comment, In Juries We Do Not Trust: Appellate Review of 
Patent-Infringement Litigation, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 623, 624 (1996).  
6. Id. 
7. See id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 624–25. 
10. See generally Altman, supra note 3. 
11. Id. at 699–700. 
12. Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside 
the Black Box, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 209, 212–13 (2001–2002). 
13. See Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts:  Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877, 888–89 (2002). 
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trace the development of Seventh Amendment precedent in the context 
of patent litigation to its current status.  Further, this paper proposes a 
system akin to peer review to replace the traditional jury in patent trials.  
Such a system would be analogous to the current “Peer-to-Patent” 
experiment at the PTO, wherein scientific and technical experts have 
the opportunity to aid PTO examiners in determining the validity of 
patents.14  The patent system is a unique system in American law 
because it boasts its own bar and its own governmental agency; in turn, 
its own court demands its own jury tailored to fill in the adjudicatory 
gap.15  Adjudication of such public rights as those involved in patent 
validity16 would find increased efficiency and credibility with public 
expert input.  Moreover, given that there are few constitutional 
constraints on adjudication of public rights, such a process likely would 
survive constitutional scrutiny.17  The area of patent law provides the 
American legal system with a unique opportunity to develop flexibility 
in the context of an otherwise cumbersome division of fact and law. 
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SEVENTH AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE 
The Seventh Amendment provides, “[i]n [s]uits at common law, . . . 
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than 
according to the rules of common law.”18  The amendment seems to 
provide for the right to a jury trial in civil suits, but its language is 
unclear, especially when compared to that of the Sixth Amendment.19  
 
14. See Ethan Katsh & Beth Noveck, Peer to Peer Meets the World of Legal 
Information:  Encountering a New Paradigm, 99 LAW LIBR. J. 365, 371–72 (2007). 
15. See Stockwell, supra note 1, at 683–85. 
16. See Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 604 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
[T]he grant of a valid patent is primarily a public concern.  Validity often is brought 
into question in disputes between private parties, but the threshold question usually 
is whether the PTO, under the authority assigned to it by Congress, properly 
granted the patent.  At issue is a right that can only be conferred by the government. 
Id.  See also In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., dissenting), vacated 
sub nom. Am. Airlines v. Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995) (“This court has held that the issue 
of validity of a patent involves public rights, not merely private rights.”). 
17. See Stockwell, supra note 1, at 691–92. 
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
19. The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides,  
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
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For example, the Sixth Amendment embraces within its scope “all 
criminal prosecutions,” but the Seventh Amendment leaves open the 
extent of its application to “[s]uits at common law.”20  Additionally, the 
Sixth Amendment requires that the accused “shall enjoy” the right, 
while the Seventh Amendment employs the more permissive phrase 
that the right “shall be preserved.”21  Finally, the Sixth Amendment 
specifies from where the jury will be drawn, while the Seventh 
Amendment makes no such specification, leaving jury composition 
open.22  The language of the Sixth Amendment demonstrates “that 
Congress knew how to use [clear,] express language when it drafted the 
Seventh Amendment.”23  The Supreme Court has interpreted the 
different phrasings of the Sixth and Seventh Amendments to mean that 
the right to a jury trial is mandated in criminal cases but not in civil 
cases.24  Further, the Supreme Court has ruled that the Seventh 
Amendment, unlike the Sixth Amendment, is not essential to due 
process and thus not applicable to the states.25   
The traditional role of the American jury under both the Sixth and 
Seventh Amendments has been to decide questions of fact, as opposed 
to legal matters.26  This responsibility was established first by the 
Judiciary Act, which was enacted before the Seventh Amendment was 
ratified.27  The Judiciary Act provided that “the trial of issues in fact, in 
the district courts . . . shall be by jury.”28  The Seventh Amendment itself 
expressly notes that “facts” initially tried by the jury may not be re-
examined in a U.S. court.29  Finally, the Supreme Court generally 
affirmed this notion, stating that “[q]uestions of fact in common law 
actions shall be settled by a jury . . .”30 and warning that “the ultimate 
 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defen[s]e.  
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
20. Stockwell, supra note 1, at 656. 
21. Id. at 656–57. 
22. Id. at 657. 
23. Id.  
24. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 152–56, 162–63 (1973); see also Stockwell, 
supra note 1, at 657. 
25. Leibold, supra note 5, at 651; see also Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92–93 (1875). 
26. See Paul F. Kirgis, The Right to a Jury Decision on Questions of Fact Under the 
Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1125, 1131–32 (2003). 
27. Id. at 1133. 
28. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, sec. 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789). 
29. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
30. Walker v. N.M. & S. Pac. R.R. Co., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897). 
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determination of issues of fact by the jury [shall] be not interfered 
with.”31 
Recently, however, the Supreme Court has shifted its focus away 
from the fact-law distinction to other concerns.  In the 1987 case of Tull 
v. United States, for example, the Supreme Court applied a two-prong 
historical-analog test to determine whether a real estate developer 
accused of violating the Clean Water Act was entitled to a trial by jury 
under the Seventh Amendment.32  The first step of the test was to 
determine whether the present action was analogous to a suit at 
common law, as opposed to a suit in equity or admiralty, as of the 18th 
century—the time of the Seventh Amendment.33  The second prong 
examined whether the remedy sought was legal or equitable in nature.34  
Taking into account the nature of the action and the remedy sought, the 
Court focused on the latter and found the case closely analogous to 
punitive damages in the 18th century, which were available in courts of 
law.35  Although the result suggested that Tull was entitled to a jury trial 
on some issues, the Court took it one step further.36  It stated that the 
civil penalties involved in Tull’s trial were not a “fundamental element 
of a jury trial” because Congress may fix those penalties by statute and 
therefore may delegate such responsibilities to judges.37   
The Supreme Court in Tull further observed that in the past it 
considered “practical limitations of a jury trial and its functional 
compatibility with proceedings outside of traditional courts of law” to 
find that a litigant was not entitled to a jury trial.38  A later decision 
qualified this consideration as applying only where “public rights” were 
at issue.39  Unlike “private rights,” Congress may assign causes of action 
involving “public rights” to a non-Article III court.40  Although the 
Federal Circuit ignored this comment in In re Lockwood, stating that an 
action for a declaration of patent invalidity may be brought in an Article 
III court because declaratory judgments may be brought properly in an 
 
31. Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 310 (1920). 
32. 481 U.S. 412, 414, 417–18 (1987). 
33. Id. at 417. 
34. Id. at 417–18. 
35. Id. at 423–24. 
36. See id. at 425 (“We must[,] . . . whether Congress can, consistent with the Seventh 
Amendment, authorize judges to assess civil penalties.”). 
37. Id. at 426–27. 
38. Id. at 418 n.4. 
39. Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 53 (1989). 
40. Id. at 52–55. 
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Article III court,41 the relevance of the court’s decision should not be 
underestimated.  For example, many issues relevant to public rights in 
patents may be decided at the PTO, thus falling outside of Article III.42  
With its specialization in technical and scientific fields, the PTO may be 
more “functionally compatible” with patent issues than a lay jury. 
Indeed, commentators and courts have long debated whether juries 
are competent to decide certain issues.43  Alexander Hamilton posited in 
his Federalist Paper Number Eighty-three that very complex issues 
“require often such long, deliberate, and critical investigation as would 
be impracticable to men called from their occupations, and obliged to 
decide before they were permitted to return to them.”44  Hamilton 
worried that demanding that lay juries decide issues that are too 
complicated may undermine respect for the jury system.45  Although not 
addressing lay juries in particular, Judge Learned Hand later criticized 
generalist courts and “the extraordinary condition of the law which 
makes it possible for a man without any knowledge of even the 
rudiments of [science and technology] to pass upon such questions” of 
high difficulty and complexity.46  Similarly, and more recently, Judge 
Michel of the Federal Circuit reflected that businesses and corporations 
competing in high stakes technology races may pressure Congress to 
increase specialization in U.S. courts.47  Because their cases have such 
large economic and practical impacts, these businesses are unlikely to 
trust a lay and generalist system with their intellectual property 
 
41. 50 F.3d 966, 972 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1995), vacated sub nom. Am. Airlines v. Lockwood, 
515 U.S. 1182 (1995). 
The Court has cautioned that the Seventh Amendment does not automatically 
entitle a party to a jury trial if Congress can and has assigned adjudication of the 
legal claim concerning such public right exclusively to an administrative agency.  
However, as “[n]o one disputes that an action for a . . . [declaration of patent 
invalidity] may properly be brought in an Article III court,” this limitation on 
Seventh Amendment protection “does not affect our analysis.” 
Id. (quoting Chauffeurs v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 n.4 (1990)) (citation omitted). 
42. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2000). 
43. See Beth Z. Shaw, Judging Juries:  Evaluating Renewed Proposals for Specialized 
Juries From a Public Choice Perspective, 2006 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 3, ¶¶ 14–16 (2006). 
44. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 527 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright 
ed., 1961). 
45. Id. at 527–28. 
46. Shaw, supra note 43, ¶ 24 (quoting Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 
95, 115 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911)) (alteration in original).   
47. Shaw, supra note 43, ¶ 25; see also Paul R. Michel, Foreword, The Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit Must Evolve to Meet the Challenges Ahead, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 
1184–85 (1999). 
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concerns.48   
Developing common law has revealed a split in the circuit courts 
over the so-called “complexity exception” to the Seventh Amendment.49  
In the case of Ross v. Bernhard in 1970, the court recognized “the 
practical abilities and limitations of [a] jur[y]” in deciding the issues as a 
factor in determining whether a particular claim gives rise to a jury 
trial.50  Later, the Third Circuit ruled that due process may require that a 
judge, rather than a jury, try certain cases, for example, when the 
complexity of a case prevents a jury from using rational means to find 
facts and to reach a verdict.51  The Third Circuit thus recognized an 
apparent conflict between the Fifth Amendment due process 
requirement and the Seventh Amendment jury trial provision.52  In 
contrast, the Ninth Circuit has refused to recognize a complexity 
exception to the Seventh Amendment, noting the difficulties that would 
be involved in developing a test to determine the level of complexity 
required to avoid a jury trial.53  The Ninth Circuit asserted that a 
complexity exception would “improperly demean[] the intelligence of 
the citizens of this Nation.”54  Further, the court in Kian v. Mirro 
Aluminum Co. asserted that proposals for specialized juries were 
“elitist” and undermined a fundamental right.55  The Supreme Court, for 
its part, has yet to rule yea or nay as the last word on the issue of the 
complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment.56 
II. THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF PATENT TRIALS 
The Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court’s modern approach to 
defining the role of the jury in patent cases began with the case of 
Markman v. Westview Instruments.57  Herbert Markman brought an 
action against Westview in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for 
 
48. See Michel, supra note 47, 1184–1185; Shaw, supra note 43, ¶ 25.  
49. See Shaw, supra note 43, ¶ 15; see also Philippe Signore, On the Role of Juries in 
Patent Litigation (Part 1), 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 791, 817–18 (2001). 
50. 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970). 
51. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1079, 1084 (3d Cir. 
1980) (affirming denial of jury trial in action for violations of the Lanham Act, the Wilson 
Tariff Act, the Antidumping Act, and the Sherman Act). 
52. Id. at 1084. 
53. In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 431–32 (9th Cir. 1979). 
54. Id. at 430.   
55. 88 F.R.D. 351, 355 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (refusing to strike plaintiff’s jury demand and 
denying defendant’s request for expert in patent licensing dispute). 
56. See Leibold, supra note 5, at 650–51. 
57. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 1535 (E.D. Pa. 1991). 
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patent infringement,58 and the jury construed the term “inventory” in 
Markman’s patent claims to include “cash” or “invoices” but not 
“articles of clothing” for a finding of infringement.59  The district court, 
however, granted Westview’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, 
asserting that patent claim construction was a matter of law for the court 
to decide.60  The court held that the claim term “inventory” meant 
“articles of clothing” and not “cash” or “invoices” and subsequently 
directed a verdict for noninfringement.61 
Upon Markman’s appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law.62  The Federal Circuit 
agreed that patent claim construction is a legal matter for judges to 
decide, likening patent claim construction to statutory interpretation, 
which is a matter of law for the court.63  The Federal Circuit agreed with 
the district court that a judge may examine the claims, the specification, 
and the prosecution history, in addition to weighing extrinsic evidence 
like expert testimony to construe the meaning of a patent claim term.64  
The court went even further to grant itself de novo review of claim 
construction.65  In a concurring opinion, Judge Mayer asserted that claim 
construction traditionally had been a matter of law but that the 
underlying factual issues must be left to a jury.66  Judge Newman 
vigorously dissented, emphasizing the hazards of de novo review67 and 
tracing the Seventh Amendment provision of a trial by jury in the 
context of patent cases.68 
 
58. Id. at 1536. 
59. See id. at 1536–37; see also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman I), 
52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995).  
60. Markman, 772 F.Supp. at 1536. 
61. Id. at 1537–38. 
62. Markman I, 52 F.3d at 988–89. 
63. Id. at 987. 
64. Id. at 979–80. 
65. Id. at 974. 
66. Id. at 989–90 (Mayer, J., concurring).  J. Mayer’s opinion includes a string cite of 
fourteen Federal Circuit opinions holding the underlying factual inquires of claim 
construction to be appropriate matters for jury decision-making.  Id. 
67. Id. at 999–1000, 1006 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“In resolving litigation controversy 
by determining mechanical or chemical or electronic truth, it is hard to understand why 
justice should be handicapped in the Federal Circuit by replacement of a live trial with cold 
documents.”). 
68. Id. at 1000 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The majority today denies 200 years of jury 
trial of patent cases in the United States, preceded by over 150 years of jury trial of patent 
cases in England, by simply calling a question of fact a question of law.  The Seventh 
Amendment is not so readily circumvented.”). 
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Markman case and 
affirmed the Federal Circuit’s finding that patent claim construction is 
indeed a matter of law for the court to decide.69  After the court 
construes the relevant claim, a jury may decide whether it is infringed by 
an accused device.70  The Court attempted to apply the historical-analog 
test and to examine its own precedent but found both analyses 
inconclusive as to the issue of claim construction.71  It instead turned its 
focus to “functional considerations.”72  The Court asserted that judges 
are better-suited than juries to construe patent claims because they have 
more training and experience in construction of written documents.73  
Judges, in weighing expert testimony, have superior ability to “evaluate 
the testimony in relation to the overall structure of the patent.”74  The 
Supreme Court finished by stressing the importance of uniformity in 
construing patent claims, a goal more likely accomplished by judicial 
interpretation than by jury interpretation.75  Although the Supreme 
Court did not expressly affirm de novo review, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed its de novo review standard two years later in Cybor 
Corporation v. FAS Technologies.76   
Around the same time that the Federal Circuit decided Markman, it 
granted a petition for writ of mandamus directing a district court to 
reinstate a jury demand in the case of In re Lockwood.77  In the district 
court, Lockwood alleged that American Airlines’ computerized 
reservation system infringed two of his patents relating to self-service 
terminals and automatic ticket dispensing systems.78  American 
counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment of noninfringement or a 
judgment that the patents were invalid.79  The district court granted 
American’s summary judgment motion on the infringement claim.80  
After American moved to strike Lockwood’s motion for a jury trial, the 
 
69. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman II), 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996). 
70. Id. at 384. 
71. See id. at 388. 
72. Id.  
73. Id. at 388–89. 
74. Id. at 390. 
75. Id. at 390–91. 
76. 138 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
77. 50 F.3d 966, 968 (Fed. Cir. 1995), vacated sub nom. Am. Airlines v. Lockwood, 515 
U.S. 1182 (1995). 
78. Id. 
79. Id.  
80. Id. 
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district court agreed that because the remaining claims were equitable in 
nature Lockwood was not entitled to a jury trial.81   
Upon Lockwood’s petition for a writ of mandamus to the Federal 
Circuit, the district court acknowledged that the only claim remaining in 
Lockwood’s case was American’s claim for a declaratory judgment of 
patent invalidity.82  The Federal Circuit noted, however, that the 
Supreme Court previously established that the equitable or legal nature 
of a declaratory judgment action depended on the controversy upon 
which it was founded.83  The Federal Circuit found that the underlying 
controversy for the instant declaratory judgment action was really a suit 
for patent infringement brought by Lockwood with an affirmative 
defense of invalidity pled by American.84  Because such a suit could have 
been brought at law or at equity during the 18th century, Lockwood was 
entitled to have factual questions relevant to the validity of his patents 
tried before a jury.85  The dissent argued compellingly that Seventh 
Amendment jury trials are not available for a determination of public 
rights such as those involved in the validity of a patent.86  The Supreme 
Court then vacated and remanded the decision without explanation.87  
Six years later, however, the Federal Circuit asserted that its reasoning 
in Lockwood was “neither supplanted nor questioned” in ruling that a 
defendant asserting only an affirmative defense of invalidity is not 
entitled to a jury trial where the patentee-plaintiff prays only for the 
equitable remedy of injunction.88 
The most recent case addressing the Seventh Amendment right to a 
jury trial in patent cases is In re Technology Licensing Corporation.89  In 
Technology Licensing, the Federal Circuit endorsed the analysis of a 
magistrate judge in a case where the plaintiff sought declaratory 
judgment of patent invalidity and the defendant-patentee asserted a 
counterclaim of infringement, seeking only an injunction.90  The 
 
81. Id. at 968–69. 
82. See id. at 969 (“The courts concluded that ‘the remaining claims are equitable in 
nature [and] the plaintiff [Lockwood] is not entitled to a trial by jury as a matter of right.’”) 
(alteration in original). 
83. Id. at 973.  See also Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 223 (1963) (per curiam). 
84. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d. at 974. 
85. Id. at 976. 
86. Id. at 981 (Nies, J., dissenting). 
87. Am. Airlines v. Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1182, 1182 (1995). 
88. Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 257 F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
89. 423 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
90. Id. at 1286–87. 
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magistrate judge, relying heavily on the historical-analog test used in 
Lockwood, ruled that the case most resembled an infringement action 
with a defense of invalidity, with only an equitable remedy sought by 
the patentee.91  The Federal Circuit affirmed the magistrate judge’s 
decision that Technology Licensing Corporation was not entitled to a 
jury trial.92   
Thus, the general tendency of recent Federal Circuit and Supreme 
Court decisions regarding the right to a jury trial in patent cases, 
although inconsistent, has been to narrow the role of juries.93  
Particularly the Markman case stripped the jury of a central role in 
deciding patent issues because often patent cases turn on the 
construction of claim terms.94  Similarly, the KSR International Co. v. 
Teleflex, Inc. case decided by the Supreme Court just last year, which 
loosened the standards for proving obviousness (and thus invalidating a 
patent),95 arguably paves the way for increased trial court summary 
judgments against patentees.  This trend would take yet another patent 
issue, already ultimately a question of law for the judge (with underlying 
factual issues), away from the jury.  Additionally, the Federal Circuit 
has focused on the remedy originally sought by the patentee, whether 
plaintiff or defendant, in deciding whether to grant a jury trial.96  When a 
patentee requests an equitable remedy, like an injunction, the court is 
likely to deny a jury trial.97   
Judges—at least those on the Federal Circuit and the Supreme 
Court—seem to believe that juries are less qualified to make decisions 
in patent cases.98  A question remains, however, as to whether the 
narrowing of the role of the jury in patent cases is warranted.  Are the 
outcomes in cases decided by judges and cases decided by juries 
different?  Do the outcomes reveal faulty reasoning or biases that 
negatively affect the administration of justice?  If parties nonetheless 
increasingly request juries, what do they hope to gain? 
 
91. Id. at 1288. 
92. Id. at 1291. 
93. See Leibold, supra note 5, at 624–25. 
94. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d at 993 (Mayer, J., concurring); id. 
at 999 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“Deciding the meaning of the words used in the patent is 
often dispositive of the question of infringement.”). 
95. 550 U.S. 398, 414–27 (2007). 
96. See In re Technology Licensing Corp., 423 F.3d at 1287. 
97. See id. 
98. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman II), 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
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III. JUDGING JUDGES AND JURIES: WHAT THE STATISTICS SUGGEST 
Implicit in the Seventh Amendment’s provision of jury trials in civil 
cases is the presumption that there is a reason why a party may choose 
to have its trial heard by a judge or a jury.  In complex, high stakes, and 
expensive cases like patent trials, it is important to explore the 
soundness of this presumption, especially when there is a statistically 
significant bias in favor of the patentee in trial decisions overall.99  In 
tried cases between 1983–1999, patentees won 58% of suits (706 cases) 
while the alleged infringer prevailed in 42% (503 cases).100   
This overall statistic could be skewed by particularly biased 
outcomes for either jury trials or bench trials.  Indeed, the patentee 
prevailed in 68% of suits tried by a jury and only 51% cases tried by a 
judge.101  Thus, as anticipated by popular perception, whether the 
adjudicator is a judge or a jury in a patent case is a significant predictor 
of who will win the lawsuit.102  Moreover, jury outcomes tend to 
fluctuate over time while judge outcomes have remained relatively 
consistent over the years.103  This fluctuation could be due to the fact 
that jurors are one-time participants in the legal system and have no 
opportunity to learn or to adjust reasoning over time while such 
experience-building is part of a judge’s job description.104   
Turning to substantive issues, including validity, enforceability, 
infringement, and willful infringement, patentees continue to have the 
edge over alleged infringers; however, choice of adjudicator remains 
predictive of outcome.105  A patent is more likely than not to be upheld 
by both judges and juries, but an outcome of validity is significantly 
more likely with a jury.106  Similarly, alleged infringers with defenses of 
 
99. See Moore, supra note 12, at 233 tbl.2.  All statistics from the Moore article are 
from a data set of cases from 1983 to 1999. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 234. 
102. Id.  This distinction between judge and jury adjudication is not valid for all types 
of trials, however.  In a study of product liability and medical malpractice cases, plaintiffs 
experienced a higher win rate in bench trials, but not jury trials.  Id. at 234–35. 
103. Id. at 235. 
104. Id. at 237. 
105. See id. at 237–38. 
106. Id. at 239–40.  Juries uphold validity in 71% of  cases, while judges uphold validity 
in 64% cases.  Id. at 239.  The data set for these statistics, however, did not include dispositive 
motions granted by judges, so it is possible that judicial invalidations were underestimated.  
Id. at 240.  One study found that judges uphold validity for just over one quarter of the 
patents decided in pre-trial motions.  John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence 
on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 212 tbl.3 (1998); Signore, supra note 
TINDELL FINAL FORMATTED 5-28-09 REVISED 6-18-09 6/19/2009  2:54 PM 
2009] TOWARD A MORE RELIABLE FACT-FINDER 321 
 
unenforceability are successful only 28% of the time with judges and 
25% of the time with juries.107  Commentators believe that juries are 
more susceptible to pressure to defer to PTO “experts” than are judges 
and thus are less likely to support invalidity or unenforceability defenses 
of alleged infringers.108 
In matters of infringement, the trend continues, but differences 
between judge and jury adjudications are more noticeable.109  The 
overall rate for a finding of infringement is 65%, or 888 out of 1359 
decisions.110  Like validity, a finding of infringement is significantly more 
likely with a jury as adjudicator (71% or 503 decisions) than with a 
judge (59% or 385 decisions).111  Further, juries find willful infringement 
in almost three-fourths of cases (71%), while judges find willful 
infringement in only half (53%).112  These larger differences between 
judge and jury decisions in matters of infringement may reflect the 
differing evidentiary burdens for substantive patent issues.113  For 
example, an alleged infringer must prove a defense of invalidity or 
unenforceability by clear and convincing evidence,114 but the standard 
for an alleged infringer to prove noninfringement is preponderance of 
evidence.115  Alleged infringer win rates with judge adjudicators reflect 
these standards.  Alleged infringers win 36% of decisions on validity and 
28% on enforceability, but only 41% of decisions on infringement 
where alleged infringers have a lower evidentiary burden.116  Alleged 
infringer win rates for jury adjudications do not reflect these different 
standards, however, prevailing in 29%, 25%, and 29% decisions for 
validity, enforceability, and infringement, respectively.117  These findings 
suggest that juries are either influenced by bias for patentees, do not 
understand the meaning of differing evidentiary burdens, or ignore the 
 
49, at 821. 
107. Moore, supra note 12, at 239.  This is not a significant difference. 
108. Id. at 239–40. 
109. See id.  
110. Id. at 237 tbl.4.   
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 239. 
114. Id. at 238; see also Ultra-Tex Surfaces, Inc. v. Hill Bros. Chem. Co., 204 F.3d 1360, 
1367 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
115. Moore, supra note 12, at 238; see also Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court 
Constr., 172 F.3d 836, 842 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
116. See id. at 237 tbl.4. 
117. See id. 
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different standards for the substantive issues.118   
Further, a patentee must prove willfulness—that the infringer 
intentionally or recklessly disregarded the patentee’s rights—by clear 
and convincing evidence.119  This substantive issue had the largest spread 
in patentee win rates between judges and juries as adjudicators.120  
Tellingly, juries find willful infringement as often as they find 
infringement, in 71% of cases; whereas judges are less likely to find 
willful infringement (53% of decisions) than infringement alone (59% 
of decisions).121  Thus, juries appear to be more easily swayed by the idea 
that alleged infringers are “bad guys” harboring an intent to steal an 
innocent victim-patentee’s technology.122  Balancing out this inequity in 
judge and jury adjudications, judges are much more likely choose to 
enhance damages in cases in which a judge found willfulness (95% of 
cases) than they are to enhance damages in cases in which a jury found 
willfulness (63% of cases).123  It is unclear whether judges purposefully 
function as a check on juries’ tendency to find willfulness or whether 
judges are simply more likely to credit the accuracy of their own 
findings on the issue of willfulness.124 
Despite these differences between judicial adjudicators and jury 
adjudicators, the Federal Circuit upholds judge and jury findings for the 
substantive issues of validity, infringement, and enforceability at an 
almost identical rate.125  Therefore, as measured by appellate affirmance 
rates, judge and jury adjudications have comparable accuracy.126  The 
Federal Circuit, however, does affirm jury verdicts for willfulness in 
94% of decisions, compared to judge verdicts for willfulness in 80% of 
decisions.127  This finding is not surprising, however, given that jury 
willfulness findings that are appealed tend to be those where the judge 
has enhanced damages; therefore, an appellate court is usually 
evaluating a willfulness finding endorsed by both the judge and the jury 
 
118. See id. at 239. 
119. Id. at 238; see also Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 195 F.3d 1322, 1334 
(Fed. Cir. 1999). 
120. See Moore, supra note 12, at 237 tbl.4. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 240–42. 
123. Id. at 242. 
124. See id. 
125. Id. at 247 tbl.7 (finding validity affirmed, jury, 78%, judge, 77%; enforcement 
affirmed, jury, 75%, judge, 76%; infringement affirmed, jury, 77%, judge, 82%). 
126. See id. 
127. Id. at 247 tbl.7. 
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in a case.128 
Fact-finder performance may also be measured by tendency to find 
for the same party when multiple issues must be resolved and the 
tendency to find for the plaintiff.129  Judges and juries differ in these 
measurements as well.130  While both juries and judges tend to find for 
the same party on multiple issues, juries so find significantly more often 
(87% of cases) than do judges (72% of cases).131  These numbers suggest 
that judges may have superior ability to resolve claims more subtly 
“issue-by-issue rather than suit-by-suit.”132  Further, which party files suit 
is a significant predictor of who wins patent claims when the jury is the 
adjudicator but not when the judge is the adjudicator.133  Patentees 
experience higher win rates when they bring the case compared to 
actions brought by an infringer (declaratory judgment action) with the 
jury as the fact-finder.134  This data suggests that juries, but not judges, 
may have more sympathy towards patentees when patentees themselves 
bring the case as opposed to alleged infringers.135  Overall, juries may be 
more likely than judges to be swayed by peripheral issues including 
which party brought the claim in patent cases.136 
Despite the jury’s partially earned reputation for lack of 
understanding in patent cases, the incidence of jury trials on patent 
issues is increasing.137  In 1940, only 2.5% of patent cases tried in district 
courts were heard by juries.138  From 1968–1970, that figure remained 
unchanged as “juries decided only thirteen of nearly four hundred 
patent trials in the federal district courts[,]”139 that is, around 3%.  In 
contrast, from 1997–1999, juries tried 59% of all patent trials in district 
courts, meaning that parties requested their Seventh Amendment rights 
to a jury trial in those cases.140  Perhaps a patentee requesting a jury 
hopes that the jury will be impressed by the PTO seal of approval on the 
 
128. Id. at 246–48. 
129. See id. at 250–51. 
130. See id. at 250–52. 
131. Id. at 252 fig.11. 
132. Id. at 252. 
133. Id. at 254 fig.13, 255 fig.14. 
134. Id. at 253. 
135. Id. at 255. 
136. See id. at 253–54 
137. Id. at 209. 
138. Id. at 210.  
139. Stockwell, supra note 1, at 660. 
140. Moore, supra note 12, at 210. 
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patent.141  If a party’s case is weak, attorneys may request a jury in hopes 
that technical questions will overwhelm the jury to increase their 
chances of prevailing.142  Or, an attorney may hope that the client’s 
position is the “morally” stronger one to elicit sympathy from a more 
malleable jury.143  A U.S. company bringing an action against a foreign 
company may request a jury trial in hopes of winning through the 
“home court advantage.”144  When examined through an opponent’s 
point of view, the reasons above would provide motivation to avoid a 
jury.145  These choices by litigating parties likely account for some 
differences in judge-decided versus jury-decided outcomes because the 
choices determine what kinds of cases are tried before each fact-finder.  
Thus, given the statistics and popular perceptions of juries compared to 
judges as fact-finders, it is difficult to understand motivations behind 
requesting a jury or a bench trial. 
IV. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?  FROM PEER-TO-PATENT TO 
PEER-REVIEWED LITIGATION 
Differences between judges and juries as adjudicators are even more 
interesting considering that neither group typically is qualified to find 
facts in scientifically or technically complex patent cases.146  Some judges 
may have more experience and skill in understanding patent law, but 
most do not benefit from any sort of technical training necessary to 
understand the facts of a typical patent case,147 which involve difficult 
concepts common to fields such as electrical engineering, software 
development, biochemistry, and yes, rocket science.  Even a judge with 
training in one of these areas would likely not be able to understand 
subtle differences between technological devices in another area.  Thus, 
it would seem that, as a fact-finder, neither a legally trained judge nor a 
lay juror should be expected to perform competently.148 
One possible solution to this problem of under-qualified fact-finders 
in patent cases is to delegate the responsibility to an administrative 
 




145. Id. at 824–25. 
146. See Rai, supra note 13, at 888–89. 
147. See id.; see also United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Judicial 
Biographies, available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judgbios.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2009) 
(noting that Judges Gajarsa, Linn, Lourie, Moore, and Newman have technical backgrounds). 
148. See Rai, supra note 13, at 888–89. 
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tribunal.149  As noted above, the Supreme Court has held that the 
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial depends upon the nature of the 
issue and the forum.150  The Seventh Amendment does not apply to 
public rights, for example.151  Further, Congress has the discretion to 
establish administrative tribunals to decide an issue without a jury if the 
issue involves patent rights as public rights.152  This discretion holds even 
if a public right is enforced against a private party.153  Thus, Congress 
could dedicate a special fact-finding section of the PTO to hold its own 
tribunals or simply to assist a court in fact-finding.154  The PTO may hire 
specialists across all scientific and technical areas to ensure accuracy and 
consistency across patent cases.155  Any judicial review would have a 
standard deferential to the PTO with respect to the fact-finding. 
An alternative and more experimental solution, drawing on Beth 
Noveck’s current Peer-to-Patent program at the PTO,156 involves a 
specialized jury more akin to peer review than to twelve experts sitting 
in a jury box during trial.  The Peer-to-Patent program, also called the 
Community Patent Review Project, is a collaboration between the New 
York Law School Institute for Information Law & Policy and the PTO 
aimed at more thorough, efficient, and effective review of patent 
applications so that only valid and meritorious patents are issued.157  The 
program employs public consultation software to allow qualified 
members of the public to submit prior art and commentary relevant to 
particular patents to the currently overworked and overextended 
examiners at the PTO.158  The software allows self-selecting contributors 
to rate and rank the information submitted, as well as each other, based 
on expertise and usefulness in the process.159  The Peer-to-Patent 
program “builds upon the notion that expertise is not centralized but 
 
149. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 
442, 460–61 (1977). 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 450. 
152. See id. at 455. 
153. Id. at 452–55. 
154. See Stockwell, supra note 1, at 688. 
155. Id. at 688–89. 
156. For more on the development of the Peer-to-Patent program, see Posting of 
Nancy Scola to Science Progress, http://www.scienceprogress.org/2008/08/better-patents-
through-crowdsourcing/ (Aug. 29, 2008).  See also Katsh & Noveck, supra note 14. 
157. Katsh & Noveck, supra note 14, at 371. 
158. Id. at 367, 371. 
159. Id. at 372. 
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distributed in the minds of those with the requisite knowledge.”160 
Considering that neither the average judge nor the average 
randomly-selected jury has the “requisite” knowledge to understand 
fact-finding in the average patent case,161 a system similar to Peer-to-
Patent may provide assistance in patent litigation.  Similar software 
could be used to allow experts in relevant fields to learn about a 
particular disputed factual issue in a particular case and then weigh in, 
providing support for the opinion.162  For example, experts could submit 
prior art relevant to validity issues such as novelty, obviousness, and 
anticipation—as in the Peer-to-Patent program163—or experts could 
identify sources that explain the meaning of particular term claims in 
the relevant technical field.  Additionally, experts could comment on the 
differences between two devices to determine infringement issues.  
Information and experts would be rated and ranked so that the software 
would present the most relevant and important contributions first to the 
legal adjudicator of the case.164  Such ranking of information and experts 
would prevent the adjudicator from being swamped with irrelevant 
postings.  Further, experts would be identified and asked to reveal any 
conflicts of interest, incurring more effective accountability than a 
traditional peer review system.  Such biographical information together 
with rankings would hold accountable self-proclaimed “experts” in 
likely satisfaction of Daubert issues and allow the community of the 
relevant field to question or even disqualify a poster as an expert. 
This fact-finding system based on Peer-to-Patent could be applied 
whether the dispute is resolved in an Article III court, in an 
administrative tribunal at the PTO, or in a collaboration between the 
two.165  Congress has the authority to amend patent litigation and to 
establish new jury practices for it.166  Of course, the software would 
 
160. Id. at 371. 
161. See Rai, supra note 13, at 888–89. 
162. Cf. Katsh & Noveck, supra note 14, at 371–72 (“Using communication technology, 
it is possible to create a new mechanism for large-scale distributed decision making that 
distinguishes legal from scientific decisions.  With procedures in place to distribute but 
interconnect these two forms of expertise, it is possible to create new mechanisms for making 
administrative decisions more broadly.”) (citations omitted). 
163. See id. 
164. Cf. id. at 372 (“Participating reviewers could use the original software not only to 
submit bibliographic information, but also to rank that information.  In so doing, they would 
collaboratively create a rank-ordered list of citations.  The software would then forward only 
the top ten citations to the patent examiner for review.”). 
165. See Stockwell, supra note 1, at 682–85. 
166. Id. at 683; see In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 982–83 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., 
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eliminate much of what composes the fact-finding portion of a patent 
trial currently, with attorneys presenting the court with evidence, and 
expert witnesses giving opinions on the stand.  This process would rely 
instead on paper and on technology but certainly could be applied 
without offending Seventh Amendment, due process, or equal 
protection concerns.167   
The proposed program could be implemented consistently with the 
provisions of the Seventh Amendment.168  The Supreme Court has noted 
in the past that “[n]ew devices may be used to adapt the ancient 
institution [of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial] to present 
needs and to make of it an efficient instrument in the administration of 
justice.”169  As to patent cases in particular, the Federal Circuit has 
asserted, “[a] constitutional jury right to determine validity of a patent 
does not attach to this public [patent] grant.”170  The Patent Clause itself 
contains no reference to juries, and there is evidence that the founders 
considered, and rejected, providing a clause that patent cases should be 
heard by a jury.171  Further, the historical-analog test used by the courts172 
is inappropriate for modern-day patent cases because it improperly 
focuses on the legal posturing of the case, rather than the nature of the 
fact-finding that must be accomplished by the jury.  Indeed, the 
historical-analog test assumes that a jury would have the capability to 
find facts using rational means.173  The 18th century founders could not 
have anticipated the complexity of modern cases for which lay jurors 
would have no rational means of understanding.174  Thus, reference back 
to the founders’ legal structuring is not an effective means to determine 
 
dissenting), vacated sub nom. Am. Airlines v. Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995); see also The 
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 202 
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (1984)) (changing litigation requirements regarding new 
drugs). 
167. See Stockwell, supra note 1, at 690–93. 
168. See id. at 690, 692. 
169. See id. at 683 (quoting In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309–10 (1920)) (alteration in 
original). 
170. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 983 (Nies, J., dissenting). 
171. See Stockwell, supra note 1, at 690–91. 
172. See, e.g., Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417–18 (1987). 
173. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1079 (3d Cir. 1980) 
The law presumes that a jury will find facts and reach a verdict by rational means.  It 
does not contemplate scientific precision but does contemplate a resolution of each 
issue on the basis of a fair and reasonable assessment of the evidence and a fair and 
reasonable application of the relevant legal rules. 
Id. 
174. See id. 
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who should preside as a proper fact-finder.  This new software program 
that would allow experts to come to a consensus on complex patent 
issues through a rational process, though not a traditional “jury,” would 
more faithfully fulfill the demands of the Seventh Amendment. 
Applying the Peer-to-Patent program to patent litigation would also 
stand up to due process and equal protection concerns.  Due process 
requires a balance between governmental interests and private interests 
in the context of governmental abuse of power or a deprivation of life, 
liberty, or property.175  As a preliminary matter, patent validity 
constitutes an area of strong public interest rather than private interest 
in patents.176  The government harbors a strong interest in consistent, 
uniform, and accurate adjudication of patent public rights that outweigh 
residual private interests.177  Legislation from Congress implementing 
the program would not be an abuse of power or a deprivation because 
there is no automatic right to a jury trial in patent cases in the first 
place.178  If anything, the right to due process would be fortified by a 
provision for technically competent fact-finders.179   
Along similar lines, since a jury trial in patent cases is not a 
fundamental right, and jury reviewers would not be distinguished by any 
suspect or quasi-suspect classification, only rational basis review under 
equal protection would apply.180  Since a system of expert fact-finders for 
patent cases would constitute a rational means to protect a legitimate 
governmental interest of effective and efficient adjudication of patent 
rights, Congress’ implementation of this program would not offend 
equal protection concerns.   
The Peer-to-Patent program as applied to patent litigation would 
increase the efficiency and the effectiveness of fact-finding in patent 
trials.  The legal adjudicator, whether a judge or a PTO administrator, 
would have the benefit of experts from the relevant technical field 
weighing in on complex factual issues not suitable for unaided judge or 
lay jury determination.  Such a program would introduce a new source 
of relevant information to the legal system, as well as expand its concept 
 
175. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332–35 (1976). 
176. See Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 604 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re 
Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 981–82 (1995) (Nies, J., dissenting). 
177. See Stockwell, supra note 1, at 692; Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 
(Markman II), 517 U.S. 370, 390–91 (1996). 
178. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987).  
179. See Leibold, supra note 5, at 649–50. 
180. See U.S. R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (rational basis review); 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage as an example of a fundamental right). 
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of what constitutes legitimate authority for decision-making.181  The 
Peer-to-Patent program at the PTO has enjoyed apparent success so far 
as influential companies like Microsoft, Sun Microsystems, IBM, 
Hewlett Packard, and General Electric have offered their patents as 
guinea pigs.182  It is possible these companies believe that such a process 
offers an opportunity for increased legitimacy of their patents.  Further, 
examiners have used information supplied by self-appointed experts and 
in two cases relied primarily on that information to reject claims.183  
Gathering information from experts using modern technology may have 
a place in patent litigation as well as in prosecution. 
CONCLUSION  
The complexity of modern patent litigation is difficult to square with 
the Seventh Amendment provision of trial by jury in some civil cases.  
Indeed, recent Supreme Court and Federal Circuit decisions have 
narrowed the role of the jury in patent cases.  This reduced jury role is 
perhaps warranted as statistics from patent trials suggest that juries may 
not understand technical issues as well as judges (e.g., evidentiary 
standards), and that juries may be biased or swayed by peripheral 
concerns.  Erosion of the traditional jury system for patent trials should 
not be alarming, however, given the public nature of patent rights and 
the lack of constitutional or statutory mandate for jury fact-finding in 
patent cases.  Further, although judges may possess extensive 
experience and skill in patent law, they are also likely inappropriate 
fact-finders in the world of patents due to their lack of technical or 
scientific expertise. 
To accomplish effective fact-finding in patent litigation, Congress 
may implement a special information-gathering system through modern 
software.  This system would be analogous to the Peer-to-Patent 
program currently underway at the PTO, wherein self-selected experts 
weigh in on prior art issues relevant to a patent in front of an examiner.  
A distributed network of experts would come to a collaborative 
consensus on disputed issues in a trial through rating and ranking 
information and each other, creating a clearer picture for the legal 
adjudicator.  It is likely that this program would overcome constitutional 
 
181. See Katsh & Noveck, supra note 14, at 365. 
182. The Peer to Patent Project:  Community Peer Review of Patents, USPTO Office 
Actions and Early Peer-to-Patent Results, http://cairns.typepad.com/peertopatent/2008/02/
uspto-office-ac.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2009). 
183. Id. 
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challenges.  It would, however, challenge stagnated views of what 
constitutes a “jury” and of appropriate sources of information and 
authority in the legal system. 
